NEW DELHI: Christmas Day last year saw an attempt to change the course of subcontinental history when Prime Minister Narendra Modi dropped in on Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif to wish him on his birthday and attend his granddaughter’s wedding in Lahore. A rocky year later, Modi confined himself to tweeting birthday wishes to Sharif and “praying for his long and healthy life”, acknowledging the deep chasm between the two countries.
The optimism created by Modi’s Lahore visit lasted only for a week, before Pakistani terrorists attacked the IAF base in Pathankot on January 2, setting the tone for the rest of the year. 2016 was marked by ramped up belligerence — increased infiltration attempts by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, repeated attacks on Indian security installations, arrest of an Indian national Kulbhushan Jadhav, who Pakistan said was a spy sent by India to disrupt Balochistan, culminating in a serious terror attack in Uri.
“It has been a steep slide,” said Sushant Sareen of IDSA, “but it seems there is greater realism within the Indian system about the nature of Pakistan and of the bilateral relationship.”
The Uri attack crossed a red line for the Modi government. After Pathankot, NSA Ajit Doval even invited a Pakistani ISI investigator to Pathankot, a first, for which the Modi government took some criticism. But Uri was a different level of terror attack. India’s response to Uri signalled that it was ready to junk the old predictable responses, which fell between the two stools of engagement and war.
The September 29 surgical strikes across the LoC were the first sign that India would use asymmetric responses to Pakistani aggression. While these strikes were announced, top level sources in the government confirmed subsequent responses would retain the same element of surprise and unpredictability, compelling Pakistan to factor in Indian responses. The Modi government tried to overcome the established notion that India would absorb these kinds of attacks because a muscular response could become escalatory which would only harm the growing Indian economy. This belief is slowly being junked, although it’s not very clear how far the government will sustain this approach.
India followed that up by going after Pakistan on several fronts. For the first time, India openly questioned the Indus Waters Treaty and has promised to fully utilize its share of the waters. New Delhi also faced off with the World Bank when it indicated that it would use two parallel tracks of dispute resolution on the Kishenganga project, even threatening to pull out of the treaty. The World Bank put its cases on hold.
Both New Delhi and Islamabad carried out a high decibel international diplomatic campaign against each other — in the UN, at the UN Human Rights Council, OIC, even the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Bilaterally, India threw out Pakistani mission officials for spying, and Islamabad gladly responded.
As the time approached for Gen Raheel Sharif to retire as Pakistan’s army chief, Indian officials speculated that if he got an extension, India would have to be prepared for an extended conflict.
However, the change of guard at the GHQ in Rawalpindi is unlikely to change much on the ground. As former NSA Shivshankar Menon wrote in his new book, describing the Pakistan “problem”, “The problem today is that the Pakistani state cannot do the things necessary to sustain the semblance of a normal relationship with India. Terrorism is hard-wired into Pakistan’s society and polity, not just into the ISI. Pakistan is internally divided. No single political force, not even the army, is powerful enough to deliver outcomes, and the country is increasingly radicalised. It is hard to see this situation improving markedly any time soon. There are multiple centres of power in Pakistan, ranging from the jihadi groups and religious extremist parties to the Pakistan army (and ISI), to civilian democratic politicians, businessmen and civil society, each of them pulling in different directions, and requiring a different Indian approach.”
Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan theatre expanded to Afghanistan, where Kabul now holds Islamabad directly responsible for the instability. China has inserted itself as a direct player in this theatre, complicating matters immensely. India has already clarified its opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes through Indian-claimed territory. China has also taken Pakistan’s side in the NSG by blocking India’s membership application. It has also put a “technical hold” on a UNSC ban on Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed which carried out the Pathankot attack. In addition, Russia risked Indian wrath by holding the first ever military drills with Pakistan.
So, while India can claim to have become more tough in its approach to Pakistan, Islamabad too believes it has not got the worse end of the stick, because it does not feel abandoned and isolated, particularly after a surreal conversation between Sharif and US president-elect Donald Trump. This is likely to continue into 2017.
Bureau Report
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